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kilocalories INTRODUCTION 
Energy policy is intended to create a  situation in which  consumers  may 
obtain the prima:cy  energy they need,  :in  the  most  favourable  conditions 
as regards quantity,  quality and price. 
To  do  this it must  take  into account not  only factors which  are specific 
to the energy economy  (developing patterns of demand,  availability of 
the various types of  e~ergy, the  economic  and political conditions 
affecting the  supply  of energy  from different  sources,  etc.) but also 
factors external to the energy market  itself (for example,  the 
maintenance  of the  economic  and  financial equilibrium,  or the exigencies 
of foreign or domestic  social policy). 
In analysing these constraints and thus defining the extent to which 
freedom  of action is possible, an  idea emerges  of the various combinations 
available for selection.  Such  is the purpose of the present document, 
1  based first on  the  stu~ of demand  prospects  and  secondly on  the  studie~ 
of the future  supply situation for the principal sources' of prirne:cy 
energy2;  it is a  descriptive synthesis of the essential problems of 
energy policy which will be  encountered between now  and 1985.  It seeks, 
moreover,  to identify the available policy options and to evaluate the 
consequences of each.  Thus  it contains the basic reasoning underlying 
the guidelines proposed by the Commission  in "Progress necessa:cy  in 
Community  energy policy"3. 
1Forecasts of pr.imar-.1  energy  demand  in the Comr.1unity 1  1975-80-85 
(Doc.  XVII/153/72). 
~edium-Term Forecasts and Gu5.delines  for the Oil Sector (Doc.  XVll/134/72F), 
:Medium-Term  Forecasts and Guidelines  for the Gas  Sector (Doc.  XVII/3G2/71F), 
Second Illustrative Nuclear Programme  for the Community  (Doc.  XVII/341/71F). 
~ 
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CHAPrER  1 
PROSPECTS  FOR  ENERGY  DE!~  - .....  - .  ..  . .  ....  . 
The  main characteristics of the world energy market  from  1960  to  1970 
>-Jere  ample availability and relatively low prices. 
Oil was  available in virtually unlinrlted quantities  and at  relative~ 
lOL'l  prices,  and covered most  of the nevJ  demand  which arose.  This was 
particularly true so, far as the Community  was  0oncerned,  which  reaped 
tl:ie benefits of the active competition in the oil market.  The  result 
was  that the price of oil was  the level of reference for the prices of 
. other types of energy with· which it is likely to compete. 
Natural gas,  an  ind.igenous and expanding source of energy supply;  shared 
·· in the  growth in energy demand,  and even  captured certaLYl  markets  from 
oil products. 
·Community  coal,  hampered by higher production costs,  continued to decline  •. 
There are sectors, .electricity generation and coking,  in which coal can 
still make  a  particularly important  contribution to the fulfilment  of 
energy requirell).en-ts,  but  even  in these sectors it has  only been able to 
maintain its position by .virtue of public. financial  support..  Imported 
coal contributes only relatively modestly to the total volume  of energy 
needs,  but it is nevertheless of. a  certain importance to those  .. who  consume 
it, notably the steel industry. 
The  progress of nuclear energy washlndered both by the low price of 
"conventional"  energy and by the inertia ,,;hich affects the general 
adoption and application of nev1  techniques. - 3-
Difficulties in the markets for certain types of energy have occurred 
from  time to time during this period,  caused by  market  forces .or by 
political events.  Examples  of this were coking coal in 1969-70 and 
oil in 1967  and 1970-71.  In general,  however,  the Community  was  able 
during the ten-year period to obtain its energy  supplies under very 
favourable  conditions. 
Since  1970  the structure of the market has  tended to change under the 
influence of a  number of factors. 
Uhile petroleum has established a lasting domination of energy supplies, 
the conditions of supply are becoming more  re~triotiye t~n. in the.past. 
\'lorld  demand  forecasts  show  that the Community  will :11a:ve  to compete with 
other buyers -·principally with tWo  ·other groat  indu,strial powers:  Japan 
and the United States -both in its dealirigs with traditional  suppliers 
a.nd  in establishing supplies from new  sources.  Also, the  oil-p~du.oing 
countries have become  aware  of the advantages they would gain in a.·· 
sellers  I  market·.  '  'By fiscal measures they have  secur~d a  proportion of 
the income  from petroleum and are  no~r seeking to intervene more  directly 
in the management  of their natural resources. 
Thus all the indications are' that the easy supply situation of the  60s 
has little chance of being maintained.  It is therefore  appropri~te tq 
examine the long--term trends· of energy demand  and.  supply a.nd  in lioing  ·..  .  ·. 
so to consider the  Community  in the 'wider context  of the international 
market.  In this way  it will be possible to  define the problems which 
energy policy will have  to'  resolve. -4-
The  year 1985  has been  chosen as the "horizon"  of the  study,  not as a 
firm date by Nhich one  \V"OUld  expect  to See  a  def~ite ·situ;ation1  but 
rather as a  point of reference for evaluat;ing market  c.onditions during 
the period 1980-90.:  This  choice of "horizon" allows path the  evolution 
of currently known  factors  and certain possible  hypoth~ses on longer 
term structural changes to be te.ken  into a.Ccount 1 • · 
.. 
B  •  .E_;r:o.~!Qect s. f.o.r.  V£Orl~d. en_er_gz,  demand.J.R...1.2§.2.· 
Th~  .. Col!lll!U.rlity ·already depends  on  imports for a  high proportion of its 
energy supplies.  Even  more  so  than in the past,  development  of demand 
b  the other econolitic  zones of the world will in  .. future be a  constraint 
to be allowed for by  energy policy. 
Though  the· out look for the-·evolution of energ{ ·:needs  varies according to 
the  degree.and:type of economic  development  of eaoh:country,  it is 
certain that  demand,  at the world level 1  will considerably increase in 
future. 
The  estimat.es which  fol1o1·1  are necessarily based on.  less searching studies 
- .  ·~  ~  ..  .  ..  '~-
than those used for the determination of Community  energy needs.  In 
spite of their nargins of uncertainty, they give a  satisfactory idea - at 
least. in their order of--magnitude' - o"f  the 'problems of world. energy supply 
which must be solved in the near future. 
The  annual average rate of increase in world  energy consumption  from  1960  .  .  . 
to  1970  was  over 4.5%.  From  1970  to .1985  the rate could be over  6%~ 
The  present l-rorld  energy  dena~~-~~-- ~O~f:l  16,qqo  .~llion tee •. 
1For the sigfiifioance of medium- and long,-term timescales in energy 
forecasts,  see tioutlook for primacy  energy demand  iD 'the :collliliunity 
1975-80-8511  (Doc.  XVII/1.53/]2-,F) ,  ..  ~--4·· ·  .... - 5 .;.. 
Fore~c¥s of_ world energ d~Il!?.nd Ut.J985.  ('09.0.z.900  tccj 
--
Actual  1970  Forecasts  198 5 
-r-----: 
Solid  Liquid  natural  PrimarJ  Total  Solid  Liquid  liatural  Primacy  Total  I 
I 
fuel  fuel  gas  elec.  ·energy  :f'uel  fuel  gas  elec.  energy 
~- --~ 
-...-:.. __  -- -
-
Industrialized countries 
trl  th fi'G'e-mar!::et  economies ·  1110  1910  820  280  4120  1100  4430  2050·  1170  9350 
Inolttd:t  ... g 
El'n  (10)  363  685  88  83  1219  255  1410  345•  345  2355 
OS 
.  480  ·,,  1050  . 680  80  2290  670  .1700  1130  700  4200  .. 
Japa._"l.  90  290  5  25  410  105  760  10  175  1050 
Countries with planned and 
centralized economies  1180  445  325  65  2015  1870  1520  1150  260  4800 
Developing countries  125  - 330  70  40  565  230  1100  250·:  220  1800 
~  ...  ,.....  ~-
World  2415  2685  1215  385  6700  3200  7050  3450.  2250  15950  -
~ 
(':Liotal  in  '000 1000  -tpe}  1690  1880  •.  8!]0  270  4690  2240  4935  2415  1575  11165 
-~---- -·--~------------..,._--·  .~---....:....  ------·· 
-~  ~--=-·- --..--. ---------- ----------- ~-'----l----------_.,6  -
The  needs of industrialized countries with free-market  economies will 
rench a  little more  than double the present  levels in fifteen years. 
Most  of them will.  be able only partially,  and  to a  greater or lesser 
extent,  to cover their needs  from  indigenous  rusources.  They will 
therefore be  buyin~ u:creasing quantities in the world market. 
This applies ~specially to oil  (abo~t 3,500 million tee will have to· be 
imported),  but  for this fuel the present and future cfrcumstances of 
tho three principal economic  zones  (EEC,  USA,  Japan)  exhibit differences 
vrhich arc worth emphasizing: 
- while in the United States oil will ·become  slightly less important 
proportionately  (from 45  to 4o%)' over the next  15  years,  the converse 
Nill apply in both the  Com;uu:hity  and Japan  (from  55  to  6Q<}G  and from 
70  to  72~;); 
i.l'l  the stru0ture of the  consumption  of oil products in the  US,  the 
Sl~pply of pl"'ducts  for  11motor fuel uses" is predominant  (s?m0  60%); 
refining is orim1tated towards  mcetuLg this·demand (residual fuel oil 
represents  only  131o)  and has had no  major difficulties in taking 
expensive  crudes because of the high market  value of the principal 
products.  The  situation is qui  to different in the  Comrrruni ty and 
Japan,  ·~rherc fuel oils  (heavy and light) for domestic and industrial 
heating purposes arc the principn.l pi'Oducts  (all fuel oils,  65%  and 
15%  respectively);  conscqtiently,  any increase in the price of the 
c:rudc  affects tho price  of these products and diminishes competitiveness 
in international markets. 
In view of tho  foregoing~ it would  seem that the traditional clients  · 
{Europe and Japan)  in the \'lorld oil market  and tho newcomers/the United 
States 1  probably requiring a quarter of their energy-consumption  from 
imported oil,  rilay not be able to take the  same  attitude to the market 
in th  G  fdure. - 7-
Countries with planned and centralized  economie~ will consume  in  1985 
two  and a  half times as  much  energy as in 1970,  and  the.s~ructure o~ 
their consum~tion.  will probably. undergo  important  changes. 
Solid fuels now  satisfy more  than  55%  of the need:  . in 1985,  the same 
.  .  . 
proportion will be  covered by  all the hydrocarbon  fuels.  This tendency 
towards  a  clot:~er a.pP,roachto  the ."industrialized free-market  economy" 
structure will nevertheless leave a  substantial margin  for the  expansion 
of solid fuels. 
The  increasing hydrocarbons  requirement  envisaged for these couutries 
casts doubt  on  the generally accepted.hypothesis of total self-sufficiency 
'  .  .  . 
for this economic  zone.  Compelling considerations of a  regional nature 
or of economic  polic1 could incline these colllltries towards  greater 
participation in world  energy markets. 
The  consumption  of energy in the developing countries will.  p:r>obably 
treble during the period 1970-85,  but  should still be  less than 
one-eighth of world energy needs. 
Fundamental  structural differences exist among  the developing countries 
as a  whole,  from  one  zone. or one  countr:y  to another,  relative to .. the 
degree of economic  development  and to energy needs and resources or the 
lack of them.  The  increase in energy needs will not,  therefore,  be 
of a  uniform nature in all developing countri,es and  in each  case the 
~~e of increase will be  determined in large measures  by  the expansion 
or otherwise of the development  of the economv. 
Although  some  of the countries in question possess the greater !fLrt 
.of the world's energy resou,rcc:Js,  their own  additional. energy. ne.cds 
will have only a .I_!Iinor  effect .on  availability of en_errg  in .the .l"rorld 
market  from  now  to 1985. - 8-
In spite of the higher rate of increase of energy needs  in the 
developing countries  1  the margin t·lhich  separates them from  the.· 
industrialized countries is most  unlikely to narrow to any great 
extent.  In 1985,  the average  consumption of energy per head of 
population should be  10,900 kg ce in the industrialized countries, 
3,300 kg co  in countries with planned  economies,  and 700  kg ce in . 
developing cotu1tries.  Thus  more  than half the world's population 
v:ill be using only one-tenth of the available  enerror~ 
l·fuatever' the Ul1certainties surrounding the development· of energy 
dema:.1d  in certain countries or in certaL"l types of countries,  and 
without  ~"lderstating the role of the other energy  sources,  it is 
clear that the prob:lcms  of t'lorld energy  supply during tl:le  next 
fifteen years will essentially concern hydrocarbon fuels,  >ll'hich 
have to  cover two-thirds of the total needs. 
Any  estimate of future  energy needs  rrrust  be based on an assumption 
of economic  growth.· ···In this respect it seems  reasonable to count 
on  an average rate of gro;vth in the  Col:JlillU11ity  comparable to that 
achieved over the last 20 years - about  5%.  Essentially,  this 
hypothesis is based on  the prospect of an improvement  in productivity, 
which,  particularly in view of the foreseeable  labour  ~pply situation, 
can only be achieved by an increased degree of mechanization  1  which . 
in turn implies :Increasing energy consumption.  Certainly one  should 
1Doc.  XVII/153/72,  "Outlook for primary  energy demand  in the Community 
1975-80-85''  de.~cribeEJ the methods by which energy demand  has been 
estireted .and  ~ives detail~d information -for each sector of 
consumption..  . ... - 9 -. 
not  overlook the  poss~bility of tec~ical advances bringing about 
reductions in the specific consumption of fuels.  .However,  apart 
from the fact that  in:.oertaLll sectors -for example,  conventional 
power stations and blast :furnaces - the possibilities for improving 
performance are. growing. progressively less  1  other  fac~o:;-s will 
make  for growth in energy  demand  -_.f~r example,. the  incroo.se  in 
consumption which  may  b_e  expected to . result  from measures to protect 
the environment. 
A further .argument  in favour of the t'l.dopt ion  of a  growth hypothesis 
is t~t it would be  imprudent  to base  energy .policy options on  an · 
assumption of a  slower rate of economic  grol'rth than in the past; 
such a  slowing-down would,  in present conditions,  be of a  purely 
speculative nature. 
It is in fact  already certain that more  than half of the energy 
requirement will have to be covered by i.mports.  It .is therefore 
best,  while  always bearing in mind the margins of uncertainty 
which beset all estimates of.  :future demand,  to avoid understating 
tho quanti  ties of energy whicl).  the Corrnnuni ty will have to obtain in 
the world market. 
On. these  .. bases energy denand should be  expected to increase by 5.2;0 
a  yeE>:r  on  average,  a :slightly less rapid rate of increase than vras 
observed b~tweon 1.960  and  1970  ( +6.2%).  The  Commun~ty'  s  .total 
energy needs would  inc~eaae in this way  from  97 3  milliot;\ tee in 
1970 to  2,000 million tee  ( 1,400 million tpe)  in 1985;  nine-tenths 
o:f  this would be for. internal consumption  1• 
-~~-~--~· .•  *""- ........ 
1Total needs  include exports and deliveries to burilC:E:rs  as Hell  as· 
internai consumption.  :·The  ~stimates for ·these ·addi  t:i.onal  items, 
about  185 million tee  ( 130 million tpe), are subject to a  ·greater 
degree of uncertainty than the estirotes of intema.lconsumption. 
It is nevertheless desirable to  tru~e them  into account  in order to 
obtain an  idea of the total quantities necessary for the internal 
working of an  economic  entity and for the maintenance of its  exte~~al 
relations. ·:...  lO.:.. 
These forecasts should be considered in a  lon~term  conterl sirioe 
t:b.Gy  do  not  take o.ccount  of  fl~ct~atioris in the busbless trend 
1-:hicn will tend to be approximately  self.....;croicelling~ ·  For e:iample, 
one might  reasonably suppose tM.t  the slackening of economic 
.  '  . 
activity observed in 1971  and  1972  can be  compensated by  subseq1ient 
movements.  The  figure  of 2,000 rilillion tee therefore represents 
the probabl·e ma.gni tude of demand  and makes  it possible to outline 
the size and nature of the main  ene.rgy  SU:pply  problems  of the 
Community  tot~rds 1985. 
A certain proportion of energy needs rray  be. called "specific" in 
the  sense that,  with present technology and because of the 
limitations and inertia of investment pa:tterna,  they can only be 
satisfied by  a  paiticuiar type or source of energy.  To  these 
.needs  should also·  'be  added those covered by certain energy types 
Nhich are available in any  case,  Whether because of technical 
c0'1Siderations  1  because of the  commercial conditions of supply, 
or because the development  of the energy types  in question will 
be brought  about  by  exigencies of a  technological nature. 
The  remaining portion of energy requirements,  Trlithin  which 
competition auong different energy  sources is possible,  represents 
about  65%  of total needs.  Thus  in 1985,  1,100-1 1200  million tee 
( 770-840  million tpe)  would represent the quantity of Community 
deLand for which competition could take place and also the principal 
potential sphere of influence for policy.  This is really,  however, 
a  maximum  figure because,  even for this section of demand,  there 
are factors of inertia Trrhich  militate against coraplete fluidity of 
the market. """  11  -
Competition among  su~ti  tutable energy sources  --'~>~till be  ii1  -· 
conditions different f-rom ,:those  experienced in the recent past, 
because  the  choice c'riteria :applied by  consumers·,  individually·. 
o.nd  collectively~ will tend :t·o  change.  The  two :tra.di  tiona! 
criteria of·quality.and price will continue to exerois8 a 
decisive influence ·but  may  become  broader in scope-. 
To  the concept  of intri.risic quality of the product and of the · 
service which. it provides will be added that -of  its effects on 
the  enVironment,  and the criterion of the lowest possible price 
l-till also be increasingly seen in the same  context.  Moreover, 
the future  commercial conditions of energy supply and new 
requirements for the protection of the  environment will add 
urgency.to the necessity of using energy in as-rational a  way· 
as possible.-- lastly, as "First Outlines'' have  a.irca.dy  emphasized, 
equal weight  IJ'lUSt  be attached to security of'  supply as· an  objective 
closely. bound, up with'. that of low  cost. '  - 12  -
PROSPECTS  FOR  ENERGY  AVi\.ILABILITY  •.  ••  =~  ...  '.  ......  •.•  .....  ··------
While it is possible to sketch the outlines of future  ettergy  demand 
in the  Comr~ity, it is most  difficult to study the commercial 
conditions  '1-.rhich  will apply to 'energy supply.  Apart  from  the 
evolution of technical a.nd  econonric  factors,  political situations 
vrhich are difficult t'o  foresee  roay  also affect the .Condi tiona of 
supply. 
'!'he  present  study is limited to the 019.in  supplY tendencies for the 
energy types which  can compete  in meetL~g the needs,  described as 
"substitutable":  oil, natu:rel gas,  coalondnuclear energy.· 
These are also the energy  sources whose  supply problems  mUSt  be 
ex~ined in a  world-wide context. 
A.  0~12 
The  extensive world reserves  ..  of o.il are. generally considered to be 
sut:fidient  to cover demand until n\lclenr power is able to take over 
·  _;.  r . 
. completely frorni fossil  f'1.l.els..  Howeverr. l.llllCh  uncerj;ainty f31,lrrounds 
the conditions ~der  whic~ oil wil~ be oatlc available to  oonsurners, 
JX.rticularly in! the Cornffiunity,  v1hi~h t·lill  depend on  imports for 95% 
of its crude oil requirements.  Even if in future  ~?- increasing 
proportion of these imports comes  from  sources which are  rel~tively  .  . 
close at  ~and (North Sea),  the Community will still depend on  remote 
supply sources for the greater part of its needs  • 
.  !  ..  ' .....  •  •  .  •  ;,, •  '.  • 
In  1970  and  1971  pro~ounced c'hanges  took place iri the oil market.  The 
.  --·  .  .  .  .  ,  ,  ..  .  ..  •  ..  . .r  ···-'•  .  . .  ,  . .  :·. 
pressure on  both  der~d for crude and i?e freight  market  created 
conditi'~ns  fav~~rable t~  substa.ntf~l p;ice' increases.  The  scope  of' 
these increases should not,  however,  be  exaggerated in those cases 
::.  l 
1For a  more  detailed survey see ,  "Med.iv.!II-term  forecasts and: guidelines 
for the oil sector'1 •  ~  .: - 13  -
where their purpose was  to compensate  for monetar,y  depreciation and 
the erosion of the producing countries'  income.  The  agreements 
recently concluded between  the producing couritiies and the  major oil 
companies  make  it possible to forecast  with  some  degree of precision 
the commercial  conditions of crude oil supply up  to 1975. 
The  average delivered cost1  of a  North African crude  u1crcascd from 
$11/tonne at the begirming of 1970 to $18/tonne at the  end of 1971. 
This increase stems solely from the application of :1e"r  ta.x liabilities, 
$7/tmme more  for the .Mediterranean basin and $3.5/tonne for the Persian 
Gulf.  Up  to  1975,  expected increases should,  taking into account  the 
recent  devaluation of the US  ·dollai, amotmt  to $3/tonne for Mediterranean. 
and $2. 5/tonne for Middle East  crude.  These  cost  increases will be 
reflected in prices,  particularly of light and heavy fuel oil which are 
price reference points ·for other forms  of energy.  Heavy  fuel  oil is 
g.enerally quoted $3-4/tonne below the crude price. 
$/tonne 




Before  ·After  1975: 
era.n-Tripoli  Teheran-Tripoli  .  ____ ___.,_.. 
.. 
~n  .s/t  ~~11 /t  ~13.5/t 
Produced cost  including 
levies and taxes 
~~9.3/t  $9.3/t  $9~3/t  .....  ,., ·- .  .. 
-·~ 
$17/t  $2~t  $23/t 
12/tce)  ($1LJ.  tee)  ($16/tce) 
Transport to Rotterdam 
_  ~~.~o-m~=ies' _prof~~s~~ 
Total  . 
($ 
--~-.........  ~-~-..,__,.  .  ............k-- ···...........---~· 
As  far as transport  costs are  conc~rned,  medium-term prospects arc 
relatively favourable;  so  long as available capacity exceeds  demand,  only 
modest  increases may  be  ~ected.  n1  the longer term,  it is difficult to 
1Ex.cluding companies  1  profit  margins. 
2  . 
Geneva agreem(mt,  February 1972, - 14  - .. 
predict the conditions which will apply to the transportation of the 
3,000 million tonnes of oil which will be  exported in 1985.;  there is 
no  reason,  however,  to expect  substantial increases in  £~eight rates 
while  economies of scale can still be  achieved. 
};evertheless,  beyond  19~5 uncertainty  surro~ds many  of the factors 
affecting oil costs,  and a  number of potent~lly inflationary elements' 
can be discerned: 
- the development. of hi&"her-production-oost  d.eposi ts CO\lld  lead to 
eventual cost  increasesi 
- the policy of producing countries,. which  for.:_many  years was  aimed at 
increasing profit by  increasing the volume  of sales,  may  in' some 
cases. shift the r..a.in  emphasis -to  increasing .proceeds per ·unit.  ·:  The 
producing counties are  exercisL~g a  growing degree of control over 
their petr'oleum resources,  eithe:r directly or by fiscal measures,_ in 
order to exert an·upwa.rd pressure on prices,  particularly in view of 
the strengthenin,; l·torld demandj 
the quantities of oil availaole are closelY linked tG·the flow of 
li1vestment  fm1ds  to  explorution,  which  can only ll1tensifY as' demand 
increases.  lrlhether d  thin  th~ present business . structure or  in the 
conteXt of greater participation by producing cotintries, ·ttie' mairi.tena.nce 
of lov<-cost  divers:lfi~d oil rescmree's: depends  on the maintenance of 
mtfficient  investment  capability. 
t f  ;_' 
...  the mterests of  tlie'-..;a,rio~s· prodtiding regions  ~iiil not necessarily 
coincidei  economic  or other necessities peculiar to  some  of them could 
contribute to  ·'th.c  roriinten:ance of a  degree of '·competition  betw~cri crudes 
~f different origins f 
_,.!  •• 
diversification of supply sources  ~Jill  reduce the  importance of certali1 
producing regions.  From  this point  of view the discove:ey· of' new 
reaouTCes;:inclnaing the North Sea.  fields,  will  ~ttract particular 
attention. - 15  ..:. 
The  l:c1om  resources in tl1e  Harth Sea do  riot  justify the hope that they 
might  n;a.kc  a  major contribution to the needs of the Comrmmity  of Six. 
In the  enlarged Community,  hO'I'Iever,  the;)' will have a  favourable  effect 
on  the balance of oil imports.  In  av~ case,  they will tend to reduce 
the demand  on  other producing regions • 
. In this  respeCt  it ·should be noted that Japan,  like the Community, 
depends  entirely on  itilports  for her oil requirements,  which could reach 
500-600 million tonnes  in  1985.  The  United States, until recently 
self-sufficient, will import  increasing quantities of oil, and some 
forecasts put the imported proportion of US  consun1ption at  30-5~0 from 
1980  onwards.  rt.is the Iiliddle East,  the principal present and future 
supplier of the Community,  \vhich '"ill also be called upon to St.:pply a 
large. proportion of the needs of thos:e  other two  zones  of consumption. 
These various contradictory :!:actors  are sufficieat indication of the 
long-term uncertainties attaching to the cost of crude oil supplies. 
If natural gas were  available in sufficient quantities it could cover 
alraost  one-third of energy needs.  Hot-rever,  from the kno\'m  reserves in 
the terri  tory of the Comrrruni ty or on  the Continent.al Shelf, availability 
in 1985  cannot be expected to  exceed 240,000 million m3 2 
L~creasing quantities of gas will have  to be  imported  u1  excess of 
indigenous availability to meet  demand,  On  present  information these 
imports could reach 23,000  million n3 a  year before 1980. 
Natu:rol  gas is a  relatively rare  form of ener;gy which costs less to produce 
than  crude oil  i  its price tends to  come  into line with those of oil 
products which it can replace  (principally medium  and light fuel oils). 
1see  111.IeMum-term forecasts and guidelines for Community  gas  supplies". 
2~t 8,400 kcal per m3• ..  16  -
Ir1  general,  free-at-frontier prices of importeCI.  gas are higher than tLose 
of indigenous gas.  This applies pn.rtioularly to liquified gas,  which 
needs a  hi~h degree of supporting capital investment  and involves a 
complex technology.  Transportation by pipeline is simpler but also 
•• ~  (  i 
requires  large amaunts of capital. 
As  an  indication,  prices in long-term contracts i"lero  as follows  in  1970 
{in  :~  per toe): 
- Dutch gas  (free at frontier) 
- Uorth P...frican  gas  (cif plus  rega.sification}" 
.:.  USSR  gas '(free at frontier) 
9."1/11~2 
11.9/14 
-9~8/11  ~6  •. 
The  outlook for  Co~ity  production beyond  1980  depe~ds on the size of 
~- .  . :  .  .  ' .  '  ~  :  . . 
any new  discoveries which are made,  particula~ly on  the Continental. Shelf. 
So  far as imports are concerned,  the consiQ.erable reserves in North Af'rica, 
•  • J  ~  :· 
" 
the USSR  and the  ~liddle East offer pqssibilities for major expansion. 
- .  '  .  . 
The  internatio~8:1 natural gas  market  doe.s  not  escape the effects of some 
.·..  •'  .  ' 
of the difficuAties which affect the qil market,  due  ~  par~icular to the 
,  •  ,·  .I  '.  :  ,  •  '  • 
increasing demand  trends which arc emerging.  As  in the case of oil, 
Japan and the United States "t-rill  be  seeking to buy gas  from  some  of the 
mo.in  :potential  supplier's ,o.f1  tha Colllliruni ty. 
Already a  rising trend in .natural gas prices can be observed.  For Dutch 
gas,  representing over half of the ComnnLnity's  internal production,  the 
price link with fuel oil has  recently been reinforced.  The  most  recent 
contracts for Algerian  LNG,  covering gas deliveries starting between  1975 
and 1980,  have been  concluded at  fob  prices vlhich are about  one-third 
above present  levels.  Taking into .\l.ccount  the increasing costs of methane 
tankers,  the delivered price is -thus increased by $2.8-4.9 per tee~ - 17  -
These  prices are comparable  to the  1975  oil price levels which will 
result from  the  Teheran  and Tripoli  agreements. 
In present  circumstances there is thus every reason to believe that 
prices of natural gas will  continue to be influenced by those of the 
oil products which it can replace,  One  cannot  rule out  the  .possibility 
of natural gas prices being forced  above  this parity if demand  should 
significantly exceed avail:t.bili  ty. 
C  ..  Coal  -
The  contraction of Comrauni tJr  coal  production will no  doubt  be  at a 
slower rate than th.,,t  which would  be  dictated by the underlying 
economics  of supply alone'  it will be mainly determined by  the political 
decisions which  are taken on  production. 
Taking into account  coking coal  requirements  and the decline in the 
consumption of  ste~m coal,  and  on  the  b~sis of present price levels 
c~verage revenue  of the coal industry in 1971:  app.  $20 per tee;  price 
of fuel oil net  of tax:  ¢12-14  per tce),the hJl)othesis  can be  advanced 
that coal production in 1985  will not  significantly exceed 100  million tonnes. 
This hypothesis is based on  prospects of rationalization and productivity 
improvements  on  the  one  hand  and  increasing oosts on  the other,  these 
factors tending to neutralize each other. 
The  Comounity  coal industry would  in the first instance ensure the. 
satisfaction of coking coal requirements1  Quantities  of  steam coal 
produced a:Iongside  this product  could be  sold to power  stations if they 
were  offered at  competitive prices and  as~~ing the availability of the 
necessary coal-fired or dual--fired capacity.  On  this point it should 
be noted that the  Community  coal's contribution to the flexibility of 
1coking coal is a  special  case  to the extent that it covers  specific 
requirements  outside the field of competition among  energy_ types  .. 
The  commercial  conditions for imports are therefore not dealt with here. ..,  18  -
power station supply patterns  ~s li~ited by the structure of the equipment.· 
Taking into account  the decisive  role  of fuel oil prices,  coal  imported 
at similar price levels  could play an increasing part in covering power 
station requirements.  This  could happen provided that imported coal 
meets the  qu<J,li ty criteria which will result from  the need to protect 
the  cnviron~ent,  and  that  sufficient price  s~ability is offered to 
conpensatc for dimin:Lshed flexibility of utilization. 
However,  the possibility of increased imports  of  stean coal acting as a 
price regulator, should not be  overstated,  .Even if in certain cases 
favourable  production and tralJ,;:Jportation costs. secure  a  cOl:t:Peti tive 
position for  steam coal in the  Cp~unity
9 s  co~stul ,power  stations,  the 
pric_e  of oil per :calorie remains  the rule for fixing the price of 
import~.d coaL  Nevertheless,  sho1.1J.d. the  de).ivered price- of, ioported 
coal fall below the price of fuel oil to the  consumer,  the  former will 
have  a  restraining influence on  the latter, 
World  trade in  ste~.m coal has until now  been relatively limited,  but will 
tend to increase because of the exploitation of new  reserves,  notably 
in Australia,  Canada,  South Africa  ~d  Poiand.  The  exp~1sion of 
supplies depends  on  the  cre~tion of  oini~g, land transport  and port 
capacities,  It is difficult to give  any  indications concerning the 
prices at which  these coals might  be  offered. 
The  volume  of world coal reserves night make  it possible.  .. to obtain 
.· .  . .  ...  .  .  -~~  .  ·.· .·  .  ·.  .  :.~ . .  ..  .  . .  :.  . .  . ~:. :  .  : 
larger  quant~tics.of imported ste&a coal  th~ the  30-40  r:~illion tee 
•  :''t''  . 
which ··represent  a::·reasonable  hypot~esis for 1985.  However,_a significant 
increase in steam coal imports. could .not be  attained_ wi,thout  price 
increases.  Moreover,  if a  higher level of imports were  recrt+i~e~-:in 
1985;  the neces·sa.i-y  act'ion would  have  to be  t<:.ken  at  relatively short 
noticeo 1  D.  Nuclear  Sner~ 
- 19-
Nuclear  energy can  reduce  the  dependence  of the  Gommunity  on  imported 
.  ' 
fossil fuels,  particularly oil.  It is thus not  only a  diversification 
factor capable"of increasing security of energy  supply;  it can also 
exert pressure  on  the prices of competing energy types  since it will 
henceforth ahmyst  at the  load diagram base,  be  the cheapest means  of 
generating electricity  • 
. From  the point ·of view of  security.of supply uranium has  certain 
aq.vantages  in that it can be  treated as  an  indigenous  energy source, 
although Community  reserves,  while not negligible,  are  scarcely 
extensive.  Uranium  reserves are widely distributed throughout  the 
world;  deposits are  abundant  and  generally located in regions where 
continuity of  supply is sufficiently assured,  Uranium's  energy 
potentio.l per tL."li t  of weight is considerable',  reducing transport 
problems  and  costs and facilitating stor.g,ge. 
At  present,  world availability of  n~tural uraniun far exceeds  demand, 
and between  now  and  1985  there  should 'be  no  problem in obtl'l.ining 
su.pplies  sufficient for Community  requirements. 
The  Community  is at present  entirely dependent  on  imports,  and in 
practice on  a  single source,  for its supplies  of enriched uraniuo. 
Although the  short--terr:~ availability prospects are satisfactory,  this 
will not apply beyond  the present decade.  A comparison'of cUBulative 
world requirements with the cumulative production from  enrichment 
plants now  working or planned - r.1a.inly  in Uorth America - shows  that 
e£ter a  period around  1980  production will be insufficient to meet  demand. 
A solution to this problem will have  to be  found before  1974  so  that 
utili  ties crdoring nuclen.r power  stations for  the··~ time  in question can 
b<:l  assured of  sufficient fuel  supplies,  The  creation of w  enrichment 
1see "Second illustrative nuc!;ear.  progr£Ul1ile", - 20  -
capacity within the  Community  would  make  a  fundamental  contribution to 
achieving the objectives enyisaged for nuclear production,  and would 
allow Community  industry to carry on  all activities associated with the 
fuel  cycle. 
Until  about  198o  supplies  of plutonium will be  limited,  but thereafter 
progressively larger quantities will be  obtainable,  which  could be re-
cycled in light-water reactors and  reduce  the requirement for ·enriched 
uranium,  provided th':l.t  non..;member  countries wi.th  energy shortages do  not. 
bid for CoiDI!luni ty plutonium and divert it from  this application, 
~  : .  . . 
Electricity can  already be  produced from  nuclear energy at. a  lower cost 
than from  a  conventional thermal station working in comparable  conditions.' 
Unlike electricity generated from  fossil fuels,  howevex-,  most  of the 
cost  of nuclear electricity is due  to capital investment"  In the 
longex- term,  the  experience acquired by  European  construction concerns 
should bring about  a  relative reduction in capital costs;  however,  if 
the reduction is to be  significant, it is necessary to achieve both a 
greater degree  of standardization in the  range  of reactor types offered, 
and to spread the  orders for each type more,  since the effects of series 
production are  enhanced by widening the market 
Investment  decisions  tru~en up  to the present  time have  determined the 
nuclear capacity which  will be  in service towards  1977 if all the 
stations which  have  been planned are set up  and  working at that time. 
Thereafter,  the scale of application of nuclear energy1 should 
increase to a  level of 130  GWe  in 1985.  Taking into account  the 
stations which  will be operational by  1977,  a  total of 150  GWe  could 
1  This  scale of applicc.tion corresponds to the incre:J.se in the total 
number  of power  stations which  are termed "competitive",  Le. 1  for 
which  investment  choices are based on  the  costs  (including investment) 
of the different energy types available.  Excluded from  this  11competitive11 
range  are hydroelectric stations,  "peak-lopping"  stations and  stations 
using fuels with special characteristics  (lignite,  derived  gases~  etc"). - 21  -
therefore be based on nuclear capacity in 1985. 
In view  of the forseBable pattern of development,  the second 
illustrative programme  has set a  target of a  minimum  installed 
capacity of 100  GWe  by  1985-
The  Community's  industrial capacity ~s such that this .amount  can be 
considerably exceeded,  since even nt. this stage the  components 
manufacturers'  production capacity is far from  being absorbed. ·  A 
margin of flexibility therefore exists which  would  permit the 
industry to respond to  any  speeding-up of the nuclear plant 
construction programme, - 22-
.2!Ui-PTER  3 
PROBLEMS  OF  ENERGY·POLICY 
A.  Structure of demand 
The  prospect·a for the development  of demand  ns described in .Chapter 1 
suggest  a pattern for the future division of the market between the 
different kinds of primary energy.  This pattern appears likely in 
view of the structural changes which will  take place in the  ma:'_n  sectors 
of consumption.  It is based on  the  assumption that the  lowest  average 
cost will be  sought in the competitive sector,  having regard to the 
rigidities and restrictions affecting certain sectors of demand.  It is 
'  . 
also  assumed that  the  relationships between the prices 6f the  different •  .. 
competing forms  of energy will not  change radically from  wh.J.t  they are· 
at present. 
In 1985,  total needs 
1  (2,000 million tee) will be  met  as  follm-rs~ 
2%  by lignite,  7%  by coal,  11%  by  electri.Q~.ty,  1.5%  by natural gas  and 
65%  by oil. 
~down  of demand  by  source  of_£ncrgy  (1970-85) 
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1  The  demand for energy for PurPoses  other thari etectncli tf generation and 
as  a  source material tdll rise to  155  million tee in 1985  and is· 
included in total energy needs. - 23  -
A conservative  estimate of the relative position of indigenous fuel in· 
this set-up suggests that  the  Community's  degree of dependence  on 
energy supplies will continue to rise over the next ten years  and will' 
have  increased from  67%  in 1970  to 70% in 1980,  No  change  in this 
trend can be  hoped for until around 1985,  when,  through 'the  attainment 
of the target set for nuclear energy by  the  "Second Illustrative 
Programr:J.e",  the  degree  of dependence  may  begin to diminish. 
While  stress must  be  l~id on  the  risks inherent in depending on  external 
sources for energy supplies,  autarchy must  be ruled out as an objective 
for energy policy.  For energy,  as for all other forms  of economic 
activity,  the  Community  can  only plan its policies ·in terms  of an 
.  ' 
expansion of international trade,  The  only restrictions that can be 
imposed  on this policy are those dictated by considerations of 
security,  necessitated to a  greater or a  lesser extent by external 
circumstances as observed at the present time. 
B.  Oil:  the key element in supplies 
Even  in the field in which  different  sources of energy are  competing, 
the market has only limited flexibility.  The  labour force  &ld the 
equipment in use in each_  ~!l.ergy sector impose  limits on  the short-term 
~changes that can be made. 
This characteristic seems  likely to persist in the  foresee"!:'\)~.~?  ~"t;j;u:re. 
An  increase in the cost of oil supplies vlill not,  therefore,  entail a 
corresponding decrease in consumption and,  whatever happens,  this 
source of energy will probably still have  to meet  more  than half the 
·total energy needs between now  and  1985  and  at  900  million tons of 
crude oil  (65%  of total energy requirements) will still be  the · 
most  prominent feature  of energy supplies to  t~e Co~unity 
at tho.t  data. 
All the  same,  it should be  emphasized that,  in ~pite. of·tbe~ 
considerable increase in the volume  of demand,  this situation w~ll - 24  -
itself constitute an improvement,  or at  l~ast a  levelling-out, in 
comparison with the  sit~~tion in the next five  to ten years,  which looks 
like being a  period which will have  to be weathered before  th~ Community 
can gradually break free- from its excessive depenaence  on'' imported 
,oil.  Th~s stabilization will be based,  firstly on oil supplies 
from  "relial?le"  areaf!,  and then on the relative amount  of natwral 
gas produqed within the  Community  or imported-from non-member· 
countries. ·.  These imports,  whils:j;  ~pt reducing dependence  on  outside 
sources,  will-have the  advantage  of spreading the risks involved. 
The  other factor of stabilization w~ll be  nuclea~ energy,. which will 
not stn.rt to make  its weight felt until .'3.fter  1980 ~ 
F,qr_;  the -qommuni ty,  therefore,  the .basiq  en~rgy policy questi.on to .be 
solv:eod  ?~?tween now  and 1985  is that of  coming through ,this period of 
tran?itio~,  i.e~, obtaining its supplies of oil on the best  terms 
possible,  f?ince  in any event oil will; have  to cover the greater part 
of the  Commun.ity1s  energy needs. 
,Thus,  without  minimizing·~he impo~t~ce of particular problems in the 
Qther fields of energy, -or of  the_pol~oies_nacess~ry to solve these 
problems, it seems  c~ear  .:th~t _oi1  policy is;t{le key iflsUe  as regards 
energy policy in the ·Cqmmu,ni ty~  In: the fqllowing pages the .problems 
relating to other sources of energy will,;therefore only be .considered 
to the  ~tent that jthey have. \l.  b_earing  on  the oil question  • 
.  ~· 
In view of the uncertainties  ~fecting oil supply conditions, 
_consideration must  be  given to the situations to t..rhich  different 
pattern~ of development may  lG~d. .  The  many  hypotheses that can be 
b1rl;1,_t  up on the .basis of the. fact.ors_at work can be  reduced in 
pra-ctical  t~rms to  two rqases;  .. on one ;hand,  a  stable market with a 
certain  surpl~s of  ayailabilitie~ ~d, on  the  ot~er hand,  a  market in - 25-
which  prices will rise appreciably as sUpplies become  short. 
1,  First case:  a  stable market 
The  first case to be  considered is that in which  competition continues 
between oil from  different  sources as at present,  The  price of oil 
would. follow  approximately the  same  lines as the general movement  of 
world prices,  with adjustments,  where necessary,  to increases in costs 
and  allowance for the  relative depreciation of the royalties add  taxes 
levied by the producer countries. 
In these circumstances the price of crude oil in 1985  could be in 
line Hi th the trend triggered off by the  Teheran  and  Tripoli  agreements, 
In view of the foreseeable increases in costs,  the  relationship betwesn 
the prices of other forms  of energy and  those of competing oil products 
would be  of the  sa~e order as they are at present and oil would 
maintain its role as a  guide  to  average  energy prices, 
Demand  would break down·in accordance with the scheme  shown  above, 
which  in particular would lead to the achievement  of the nuclear 
energy target of  100  GWe  installed capacity in 1985,  the persistence of 
a  certain contraction in the  Community  coal industry- which nevertheless 
would  be unt'.ble  to do  without  government  subsidies - and  a  moderate 
increase in iBports of coal from  non..member  countri'es;  The 
exploitation of present known  reserves of natural gas in the  Community 
would  have  levelled off and the  only imports would be  those under 
contracts and declarations of intent which have  been  concluded at the 
time  of writing. 
It has been  suggested above  that oil would  retain its leading part in 
determining the level of prices of competitive forms  of energy,  which 
would  show  variations from  the price of oil of the  same  order that  they do 
now"  ~1e general  scheme  of prices would  therefore follow the  same 
pattern as oil,  n~nely one  of moderate  increases"  However,  if one - 26.-
takes the price of oil as a  constant in order to calculate the average 
supply  c~st it seems  that the price structure· in 1985  might  be  ~ore 
favourable  than in 1970,  through a decline in the proportion of coal 
and  the increasing importance of nuclear energy, 
2.  ~cond case:  large  incre,.:>.~es  in oil price.!. 
Ano-the~ possibility l.s  one  in which  factors making for :rigi:di ties 
in the availability of  oil supplies become  preponderant~  leading to 
sharper price rises. ·  This wo;ld be the  case~ for exaniple,  if 
production. were  deliberately  re.~tricted or if investment in oil 
prospecting were not maintained at an  adequate level.· 
Such  an  escalation in prices could profoundly codify the  structure of. 
energy demn.nd  in the Community  if it reached the stage of changing the 
relationship between the price of oil and  the costs of competing forms 
of energy: 
(a)  at the worst,  oil consumption would  be  concentrated mainly on 
specific uses,  i.e., for motor fuel  and for certain applications as 
a  raw  materiaL  Consumption  of liquid fuels 'omuld  be limited 
roughly to the  amount  inevitably produced as a  by-product of 
refining the oii" used.  for such specific purposes.  The  volurJe  and 
structure of demand  for crude oil would  therefore be  appreciably 
different from  the first  case we  discussed; 
(b)  prospects for the  development  of nuclear energy would  be more 
favourable.  It might  meet  a  larger proportion of electricity demand 
and  even be  extended to other uses; 
(c)  some  reserves of natural gas in the  Community  which  are at present 
considered not  commercially exploitable might  become  exploitable 
and the  search for hydrocarbons in the  Coroml.lnity· (including the new 
member  states' territories and the  Continental Shelf)  would be 
stimulated.  Imports of gas from  non-member  countries might  reach - 27-
a  very high level;  even natural  gas  loo~ted in remote  regions would 
have  a  lower delivered price than the oil reference price. 
(d)  the competitiveness of the  Community  coal industry would be 
improved,  and the  n.ddi tional revenue whibh ·it.  would  obtain would 
.,  .  '.  ~  -
make  at least part, if not all, production and  sales subsidies 
unnecessary but would not lighten its charges incurred in the 
past.  In this context production would not be much  more  than 
100  million tons,  but it would  remain to be seen whether inevitable  '  . 
increases in the costs of production would not cancel  out  the 
increases in revenue.  In any  case a  ~oal output  of the  same  order 
as at present could not be  maintained without  subsidizing a 
proportion of coal production; 
(c)  demand  for coal  from  non-member  countries could expand markedly, 
Account  must  be  taken of the relatively long period requ:j.red for 
supplies to become  available and of the price increases which 
would be bound  to result, particularly in a  situation in which the 
new  aspect of the oil market might  give rise to a  world shortage 
of energy. 
There  are limits,  however,  to possible increases in the price of 
oiL. 
On  the  one  hand,  North fl.merica  possesses substantial reserves of 
bituminous  shales and  sands from which  considerable quantities of 
oil could be  obtained.  The  cost of exploiting these  shales and sands 
is about  t~~ce  (per ton of oil produced)  the present price.of 
~liddle East  cr~ce delivered US.  This figure  sets a  ceiling which oil 
prices could not  exceed,  at least for th9.t  element  of consumption 
where  there is no  substitute for oil, i.e., motor fuels  and  the 
minimum  quantity of products involved in refining. -.28-
Furthermore,  the possibility of recourse to imports of  steam coal sets 
another limit to rises in oil prices.  Steam  coal is already available 
in some  Comllrun:i ty countries at prices 1ot-~er than those  of fuel  oil, 
including to.Xes, 
These  two  potential competitors  (oil. frou1  shale and  s;:.nds,  and  steam 
coal)  would not have  an  immediate  restraining effect on the rise in 
oil prices.  Ti~e would be  required to make  the investments needed to 
create an adequate  supplyo 
But if the possibility of a  sharp increase in oil prices linked with 
diminished flexibility of  supply were to become  real, it is certain that 
oil consumption would rapidly cease to  expand and wight .even decrease 
to  a  large extent after a  few Yeo.rs  as  large consumers  changed to 
other· sources of-energy.  Such a  development would not be in·the 
interests of· either the  oonsuraing or the producing countries.  The 
former would be  opliged to pay more  for energy that they  cn.nnot  do 
without.  The  latter would dsk losing a  large part of their market 
and'  thus  depriving thenselves,  perhaps  onco  and for n.ll,  of the 
financial. resources  they mo8t  need to .launch their ·economic  development. 
D.  Restrictions on  securi  t;y: ..Q.f  .S1Y:P.1z 
·Even if the  second possibility considered has some  exaggerated characteristics, 
it underlines the risks inherent in changes  that are taking place in 
the structure .of.  the world oil-market.  If competition between oil 
, from· ·different  se>urces  were ·no .longer to be possible,  powerful 
disturbances  could affect the uhole energy.market, if not  the.w()rld economy. 
There  are good reasons for hoping that these structur3.l  changes will 
take place in an ordered wcy  without  entailing such serious consequences, 
But  there are reasons for concern until  a.  genuine long-term stability is· ·- 29-
· achieved,  because  the  changes  thataare tah.'i.ng  place involve the danger 
of tensions in varying degrees that might  even result in the  temporary 
interruption of  some  supplies,  Some  of or all the oil suppliers 
might  be  tempted by econonic conditions to make  and inforce fresh demands, 
VIe  are therefore confronted >lith  two  aspects of  t}1e  .problem  presented 
by sec'Ll:ri ty of  suppl3r,  as  regards not ouly oil but  also other forms  of 
imported  ener~J-
On  the  one  hand,  with a  market  less flexible than in the past,  efforts 
must  be  made  to invest it with nore flexibility so  C'l,S  to  ensure 
long-term  supply conclitions which  are favourable £rom  tho  point of view  of 
both price and stability while ·paying due· regard to the legi  tim.ate 
interests of the countries possessing the  resources to kindle the 
demand.  It is therefore necessary to act in such a  way  that in 
1985  tho  situation will resemble  as closely as possible the first 
case  examined in the preceding paragraph  ( C  1 • ) , 
Furtherr,1Qre,  it is neC()Ssary  to guarantee  rcgule.r and sufficient 
supplies whatever the  structure of tho market.  Various measures  can 
be put in hand to  reduce  the  risk of interruptions in supply or to 
limit their effects:  diversification of sources of supply,  the 
creation of emergency  stocks,  keeping reserves of production and 
tr~1sport facilities,  etc.  Arrangements need to  be  made  on  these 
lines which will operate permn.nontly  as  long 2.s  the market is seen 
not to be  sufficiently stable.  'Ihe  expenses involved must  be  considered 
as a  part of the costs of imported energy  ~d  must  be  adjusted in 
proportion to the risks involved. -30-
CH!I.PTE11...4 
THE  MEANS  OF  ACTION 
Long-term security of supply could be improved by various means,  among 
which policy choices will have  to be  made. 
_,  Un~er an:t  circumstances,_  m~.re rational ;utilizatiop of ·er;,.ergy  would 
make  it possible to reduce  demand  and thus avoid  ~ccentuating the· 
pressure  on the market which will result from  the growth in world 
needs,  However,  for several categories of use,  technicc,l constraints 
severely limit the improvements \..rhich  can be made.  r.fureover,  there 
is tho  problem of .decidi~g what  measures  can be  tiken to encourage 
more  rational uso  of energy without  impeding the  oqnsuuer1s 
ability to obte.in .the fuel  which best suits his  own  needs. 
- Prioary energy stock,p,.ilin,g not only provides a  remedy for the 
direct·eff~cts of teillporary interruptions in petroleum supply,  but 
can also,  to n  certain extent,  contribute to  a  longer-term  e~sing of 
the  situation.  The  existence of  substan~il),l stocks  wou~dmake it 
possible,. for exr1mple;  to  accept doliverately !:llld  for a  fcirly 
,·.  .  ' 
long period the  severance of certain channels of supply in the  event 
of highly  disadv~tngeous price conditions suddenly being gttached 
to them"'  The  underground storage of a  further oor.th's consumption 
would  cost  ~0.2.-0.3 per tonne  of oil consuned,  a  fairly modest 
cost  compared with the  pl~Ce increases.which could be  expected, 
However,  some  ti~e would. elapse before stocks could be built up 
appreciably above  the  9D  days'  consumption objective which the 
CoQmission. proposes for 1975,  partly because of the substantial 
investment  required and partly because of the need to try to obtain 
tne necessary qunnti  t,iol'l  of oil under favourable  conditions. - 31  -
- The  d~ve~sification of ,sources  of SU£213  increases both  shor~ and 
long-tero. socuri  ty,  the  former bJ increasing the  ~'U!tlber of options 
available,  the latter by reducing the dDnger that individual 
producers might  succeed in dominating the  m~i:-ket. 
In this context,  North Sea oil production,  although relatively modest 
.on  present :information  (100-~150 million toli:hes  a  year towards  1985) 
1-rill  appreciably increase the proportion of  11rclinble" oil 1r1ithin 
tho totai supplies. 
- The  level  of  CoL1IllUl1i ty coal production for "thermal" applications 
will  depend  essentially on the  extent  of which  support is provided 
by public  authol~ties,  taking into account  CA~ectod increases in 
costs,  pDxticularly wages,  Clear guidelines in this sphere wouid 
allow consumers,  and in particular the electricity producers,  to 
adapt· their pla."lt  dnd fuel. supply policies aocordingly.·  But short 
of a  COmplete. reversal o{ th~ price relatiOl'lShip  "V..if th thC3  reference 
fuel- precisely the situation ~'lhich ·it isoought to avoid- it is not 
to. be expected that present levels of !Jroduction l·lill be maintained 
in the long term.  Having rege.rd to its spdoial characteristics, 
coal  production·would make  only  a  limited contribution to long-term 
security o:f  supply for  po'Vter  sta.tions, 
- ~o.f  -~t~_coal have  so  far been lirni  ted in quenti  ty.  World 
reserves are very large and  scvcrsl countries are potentially in a 
position to  export coal to Europe,  but  tr~sport costs will prevent 
these coals from being cornpeti tiv'e lid th oil  and natural  gas  .. 
- There is always  the possibility that this ei  tu~tion oight change 
'with the  development  of new  production and transport equipment in the 
producing countries,  and provided that  inc~eases in production and 
transport costs do  not  m~tch the  rata at which oil prices rise ~ 32-
With ari  nppropriato policy,  the usc or  addi  tionc,l  quanti ties of 
imported steari coal in power stations would  reduce  demand  for oiL 
Community  hat'L1;I'al  f$8:S  production will certainly contribute to  reduce 
dependence  on oil, but in future  a  policy more  attuned to  resource 
conservation will become  necess".ry and,  all other things being 
eqt41.l,  only a  lir.1i ted increase cBn  be .e;:pected in the rate .of 
ext~iction from.lmown indigenous  reserves..  Hhat  can be  extracted 
froni  the North Sea is mostly likely to be used by the new  members 
of the  Community,  But,  looking further ahead,  an  increase in 
exploration in the  Community  might  perhaps produce an  increase in 
the contribution of natural gas from internal  sour~es.  Large 
quanti  tics of natural gas are available 'in the  Sovi.et Union, 
Uorth Africa and the  M':i.d.dlc  East.  Co!lliiluni ty irilpo:;.•ters  have 
already contr!lcted supplies from  the first tvio  of these regions,  which 
over the next few  years will also be  suppl;ying gas to even w.ore 
distant destinations,  such as Japan and the United States. 
The  procurement  of increased supplies frora  these extcrnd  s0urces 
would require considerable  00,pi tal invest::1ent  in pr-Jce3sing £ind 
transport  equipment  (liquefaction installations,  tankers,  pipelines, 
eto.). 
Roplaoemont  of oil by natural  ge>.s  from non-member  countries would 
doubtless not  reduce dependence  on ioported cnermr,  but it would 
affo~l the  ~dvantage of greater diversification of supply  sources 
The  nuclear industry's objective for 1985  is an installed power  ..., ... ..-.r-
station capacity of  100  GWe.  Achieving a  subst~tially higher 
figure would make  it possible to reduce,  as early as  1980,  fuel  oil 
requirement's for electricity production. .•  33 
IJ.his  speeding-·U::?  of tho nuclear equipment  programme  would  have  2n 
effect that would  sub.sequently mean  an  evan more  rapid reduction in 
oil  requirements  .. 
In any case,  the rate of dovelapmant.of nuclear energy will depend 
on· tho extent to which  certain conditions are satisfied;. 
liberalization of markets,  restructuring of the construction 
I 
industry and harmonization of-standards and of construction 
specifications; 
speeding the procedure for authorizing tho  construction and use 
of plants; 
reservir~ sites,  strengthening the  lin_ks  for the pooling of 
reaerves•  .  t 
guarantees of availability of fuel,. particularly enriched 
ur<mium,  present plans for the supply of Hhich are ba.sed  on  the 
miniL1um  objective mentioned above, 